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HOLMES V. WALTON AND ITS ENDURING
LESSONS FOR ORIGINALISM
JUSTIN W. AIMONETTI*
Originalism is nothing new. And the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1780
decision in Holmes v. Walton shows it. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court disallowed a state law as repugnant to the state constitution because the
law permitted a jury of only six to render a judgment. To reach that result, the
court looked to the fixed, original meaning of the jury trial guarantee embedded
in the state constitution, and it then constrained its interpretive latitude in
conformity with that fixed meaning. Holmes thus cuts against the common
misconception that originalism as an interpretive methodology is a modern
development.
Not only did the court in Holmes rely on the animating principles of
originalism to reach its decision, but by disallowing the state statute, it also
granted relief to loyalists just months after Americans suffered their worst
defeat of the Revolutionary War. Holmes, then, also shows that in times of
crisis, originalism is a virtue rather than an encumbrance. By constraining
judicial decision-making especially during periods of tumult, originalism
safeguards the rule of law. Originalists today should look to past cases like
Holmes for guidance and support, particularly in the face of growing calls from
non-originalists and common good constitutionalists to cast originalism aside.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reading just about anything published on originalism this millennium
leaves one with the impression that the interpretive methodology first came
about in the 1980s. That impression is to some extent true. Paul Brest coined
the term “originalism” at the start of that decade.1 And self-described
originalists engaged in rigorous debates over the methodology’s wrinkles in the
‘80s as well.2 Yet the two animating principles of originalism—that the
communicative content of a textual provision becomes fixed at the time of the
text’s adoption (the “Fixation Thesis”) and that the text’s fixed meaning ought
to constrain the interpretive latitude of decisionmakers today (the “Constraint
Principle”)—arose well before the Reagan Revolution.3 Indeed, originalism
was already in force during the American Revolution.
While some scholars have explored originalism during the Early Republic,4
this Article is among the first to argue that state court judges employed
originalism’s animating principles to interpret state constitutional provisions
well before the ratification of the federal Constitution. In particular, this Article
explores the “understudied” and “overlooked” New Jersey Supreme Court case

1. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
204 (1980).
2. Edwin Meese, III., The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464–66 (1986); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (influencing generations of originalists for
years to come); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
3. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015); see also Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and
the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2018) (“Although we maintain that
originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation is as old as the Constitution itself, the roots of
originalism as a distinctive theory of interpretation can be traced back to 1980.”) (emphasis omitted);
Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1218
(2013) (“The use of any version of originalism as a method of interpreting the Constitution has waxed
and waned between 1787 and today . . . .”).
4. See LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE: A NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019) (exploring originalism at the time of the Constitution’s ratification);
Joel Alicea, An Originalist Congress?, 6 NAT’L AFF. 31, 38 (2011). But see JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE
SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018) (arguing
that the Constitution would take shape with time).
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of Holmes v. Walton.5 Though some originalists, John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport to name names, have noted Holmes as well as its originalist
underpinnings in passing, no originalist has explored the case in any detail.6
Holmes v. Walton, decided in 1780, involved a challenge to a New Jersey
statute that permitted a jury of only six to deliver a judgment.7 The New Jersey
Constitution guaranteed the right to a “jury trial,” but it failed to elaborate on
what that right entailed.8 Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court deemed
the state statute permitting a jury of just six repugnant to the state constitution’s
jury trial guarantee.9 Many have celebrated Holmes as “the earliest precedent
for judicial review.”10 And rightly so. But the decision stands out for so much
more.
Though the court’s actual opinion is lost to history, archival sources suggest
that the New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision on the state constitution’s
text and the historical background principles animating the text’s original
meaning.11 In doing so, this Article contends, the court engaged in preratification originalism. The court, in other words, looked to the text enshrining
the right to a “jury trial” and then to the original public meaning of jury trial at
the time of the New Jersey Constitution’s adoption when it disallowed the state
law.12 Viewed from this vantage point, Holmes emerges as an example of
5. Mary Sarah Bilder, Expounding the Law, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1133–34 (2010).
6. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 795 (2009) (refuting
another scholar’s argument that the court in Holmes v. Walton moved beyond the text and background
principles when interpreting New Jersey’s constitution).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III; see also Justin W. Aimonetti, Note, Colonial Virginia: The Intellectual
Incubator of Judicial Review, 106 VA. L. REV. 765, 766 (2020) (exploring the repugnancy principle).
10. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 407–08 (2008); see also Wayne D. Moore,
Written and Unwritten Constitutional Law in the Founding Period: The Early New Jersey Cases, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 341, 341 (1990) (“Holmes is the earliest known example of judicial review in the
American colonies.”); Michael L. Buenger, Friction by Design: The Necessary Contest of State
Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 571, 582 (2009); Joshua Seth
Lichtenstein, Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey’s Constitutional Commitment to Equal
Educational Opportunity, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 429, 449 n.95 (1991); Robert L. Nightingale, How to
Trim a Christmas Tree: Beyond Severability and Inseverability for Omnibus Statutes, 125 YALE L. J.
1672, 1702 (2016).
11. See infra Part III.
12. Original public meaning originalism, as opposed to original intentions originalism, “posits
that the object of interpretation is the text as reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the
time of the provision’s enactment. In other words, it is the text, not the intentions of the enactors, that
is key to interpretation.” John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and
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judges engaging in originalism even before the ratification of the federal
Constitution.
Not only did the New Jersey Supreme Court in Holmes rely on the
animating principles of originalism, but the court, by disallowing the state
statute, also granted relief to loyalists just months after Americans suffered their
worst defeat of the Revolutionary War.13 Despite the military crisis, the court
did not pull a Korematsu v. United States and contort original public meaning
to reach a result that would have advanced the American war effort.14 The text
of the state constitution and illuminating history—rather than subjective will
and trying circumstances—drove the court’s decision. In the face of growing
calls from non-originalists and common good constitutionalists to discard
originalism as an interpretive methodology,15 this Article contends that
originalists today should look to past cases like Holmes for guidance and
support. Many critics attack originalism as either an anachronistic methodology
privileging the views of those who came centuries ago or as an unsatisfactory
methodology incapable of achieving the “common good.”16 But originalism’s
Original Public Meaning, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2019); see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1243, 1251 (2019) (“Most contemporary originalists aim to recover the public meaning of the
constitutional text at the time each provision was framed and ratified; this has been the dominant form
of originalism since the mid-1980s.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Chimerical Concept of
Original Public Meaning, 107 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2021) (critiquing original public meaning
originalism because the theory is incapable of resolving “any historically contested or otherwise
reasonably disputable issue”).
13. See generally MARK EDWARD LENDER & GARRY WHEELER STONE, FATAL SUNDAY:
GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE MONMOUTH CAMPAIGN, AND THE POLITICS OF BATTLE (2016).
14. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Neil M. Gorsuch, Why Originalism is the Best Approach to the
Constitution, TIME (Sept. 6, 2019), https://time.com/5670400/justice-neil-gorsuch-why-originalismis-the-best-approach-to-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/S7GV-CKYF].
15. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009); see also Josh
Hammer, Common Good Originalism: Our Tradition and Our Path Forward, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 917, 954 (2021).
16. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, COMMON GOOD CONSTITUTIONALISM (2022). One of
Professor Vermeule’s main (though far from only) critiques of originalism is the subjectivity inherent
to the level of generality at which a judge analyzes the original public meaning of a textual provision.
See id. at 61; see also Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 487
(2017) (exploring the level-of-generality problem in relation to contested questions of constitutional
law); Mark Anthony Frassetto, Judging History: How Judicial Discretion in Applying Originalist
Methodology Affects the Outcome of Post-Heller Second Amendment Cases, 29 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 413, 439 (2020) (noting that “[a]ssessments at the higher level of generality almost always lead
to a finding that a challenged regulation impinges on the right;” whereas “[a]ssessments of the right at
a lower degree of generality more often lead to laws being upheld”). Professor Solum’s answer to
Vermeule’s critique is that “there is no levels-of-generality problem for original-meaning originalism
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critics fail to recognize that the limited capacity of originalism to effectuate
certain political aims is one of, if not the, critical points of originalism. In times
of chaos and uncertainty, originalism serves as an internal and external
constraint on judging and thus safeguards the rule of law.17
To make its case, this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I offers a bird’seye view of originalism as an interpretive methodology, focusing on the
Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle. Part II provides a detailed account
of Holmes v. Walton, which is a case that has been vastly underexplored by
academics and the like. Part III argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court
reached a quintessentially originalist outcome in Holmes and almost assuredly
relied on the two animating principles of originalism to arrive at that outcome.
Part IV highlights three key takeaways from Holmes for originalism and
beyond: (1) that originalism as a methodology is not a product of the latetwentieth century; (2) that Holmes demonstrates the virtues of originalism as
both an internal and external constraint on judging; (3) and that Holmes casts
doubt on the original correctness of current Supreme Court doctrine governing
the permissible number of jurors in both civil and criminal cases.18 Much as a

or for any form of originalism that focuses on the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text” because
linguistic meaning encompasses the “meaning of the text at the level of generality provided by the
relevant words and phrases in the text itself.” See Lawrence Solum, Smith on Originalism & Levels of
Generality,
LEGAL
THEORY
BLOG
(Apr.
3,
2017),
https://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2017/04/peter-j-smith-george-washington-university-law-school-has-posted-originalismand-level-of-generality-georgia-law-review.html [https://perma.cc/C7SP-PC83].
17. Originalism safeguards the rule in law because originalist decisions are for the most part
“falsifiable.” See Kian Hudson, Originalism: Its Problems and Its Promise, LIBERALCURRENTS (Aug.
15,
2019),
https://www.liberalcurrents.com/originalism-its-problems-and-its-promise/
[https://perma.cc/6TQ4-WTNW]. Originalism “obliges judges to ground their decisions in objective
evidence” about what the reasonable reader at the time would have understood a word or phrase to
mean, rendering the theory to some extent falsifiable: Did the judge follow objective evidence about
the original public meaning of a word or phrase? See id. If not, then the prior decision may be subject
to overruling where it was demonstrably erroneous. See Justin W. Aimonetti, Second Guessing Double
Jeopardy: The Stare Decisis Factors as Proxy Tools for Original Correctness, 61 WM. & MARY L.
REV. ONLINE 35, 48–49 (2020).
18. On November 7, 2022, the Supreme Court released orders. Among the orders included the
denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in Ramin Khorrami v. Arizona, No. 21-1553 (U.S. Nov. 7,
2022). That petition presented the question whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. Though the Court
denied the petition, Justice Gorsuch penned a forceful dissent from the denial of certiorari. See
Khorrami v. Arizona, No. 21-1553, 2022 WL 16726030, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Relying on the original public meaning of the federal
Constitution along with historical background, Justice Gorsuch noted in his dissent that “[f]or almost
all of this Nation’s history and centuries before that, the right to trial by jury for serious criminal
offenses meant the right to a trial before 12 members of the community.” Id. at *5.
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nonunanimous verdict is no verdict at all, a jury of fewer than twelve may itself
be no jury at all.19
II. ORIGINALISM’S BUMPERS: THE FIXATION THESIS AND THE CONSTRAINT
PRINCIPLE
If originalism is anything, it is not a mathematical formula. A judge does
not plug a legal question into an originalism calculator to get an answer. The
interpretive methodology simply does not “promise a step-by-step guide to
correct legal answers, any more than the scientific method promises a step-bystep guide to curing malaria.”20 What originalism does offer is a framework for
how to go about interpreting text.21
Think of originalism as akin to bowling with bumpers. Having the bumpers
up does not guarantee a strike; just like a judge relying on originalism as an
interpretive methodology does not guarantee a particular (or even a correct)
legal outcome. But the bumpers provide the bowler with some assurance that
the bowling ball will end up in vicinity of the pins; just like originalism provides
a judge with some assurance that a gutter ball is not in the offing. Though
originalists disagree about much,22 contemporary originalists unite around
originalism’s two bumpers: The Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle.23
A. The Fixation Thesis
The Fixation Thesis represents originalism’s right bumper. The Thesis
stands for the following proposition: The original public meaning (or the
communicative content24) of text is fixed at the time when the text is framed
and ratified.25 A word’s meaning, in other words, “is fixed at the time it’s
19. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020).
20. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 LAW & HIST
REV. 809, 820 (2019).
21. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 HARV. L. REV. 777, 828
(2022); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
817, 822 (2015).
22. Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1305
(2019).
23. Solum, supra note 3, at 6; see also Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE
L. J. 156, 157 (2017) (“Yet the core ideas serve better as a summary than a definition; using them to
circumscribe the theory is a mistake.”).
24. “The communicative content of a writing is the content the author intended to convey to the
reader via the audience’s recognition of the author’s communicative intention.” Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 277 (2017) (emphasis omitted); Jack M. Balkin, The
New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 641 (2013) (“Interpretation tries
to determine the Constitution’s original communicative content.”) (emphasis omitted).
25. Solum, supra note 3, at 1.
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enacted, whatever that time may be.”26 That is true even if the meaning of a
word drifts with time.27 It is also true even though “new applications of that
[fixed, original] meaning will arise with new developments and new
technologies.”28 Using a modified version of Professor Gary Lawson’s friedchicken-recipe example might help elucidate the Fixation Thesis.29
Imagine you stumble upon a pie recipe in your great-great-grandmother’s
attic. The recipe dates back centuries. It lists twenty ingredients. Some look
familiar. Some seem off: one pound of salt and one pinch of sugar. Assume,
however, that a pound and a pinch meant the opposite of what they mean today.
The meaning of the two has inverted with time: In 1805, a pound meant a pinch
and a pinch meant a pound.30 The Fixation Thesis calls on a modern reader of
the old recipe to read the ingredients in accordance with their fixed meaning in
1805, leading the reader to add just a pinch of salt rather than a pound to the pie
recipe.31
The process of uncovering the original public meaning of a word, especially
a word from centuries ago, is often a laborious enterprise.32 Understanding
whether the meaning of a word like “pinch” or “pound” has drifted with time
26. Dean Reuter, Thomas Hardiman, Amy Coney Barrett, Michael C. Dorf, Saikrishna B.
Prakash & Richard H. Pildes, Showcase Panel II: Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?, 69 CATH. U.
L. REV. 683, 716 (2020) (statement of Prof. Randy Barnett).
27. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378
(2013).
28. Gorsuch, supra note 14; see also Mike Rappaport, Originalism, the Fourth Amendment, and
New Technology, LAW & LIBERTY (Dec. 6, 2019), https://lawliberty.org/originalism-the-fourthamendment-and-new-technology/ [https://perma.cc/4X5M-F4QV] (“Since such technology did not
exist at the time of the Constitution, the [Constitution’s text] did not specifically address it. In some
cases, though, the new technology would seem to be unambiguously covered by the right [enshrined
in the text]. But in other cases, it might not.”).
29. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1825–26
(1997).
30. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 519 (2003)
(“[T]he conventional usages of individual words change over time.”).
31. The modern recipe reader should try to model how a hypothetical reasonable person from
1805 would have read the list of ingredients. See Fallon, supra note 12, at 1440; Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48–49 n.11 (2006) (noting
that “an all-star roster of originalist scholars” have “endorsed reliance upon the reasonable person in
constitutional interpretation”).
32. As Justice Scalia put it: Discerning “the original understanding of an ancient text” means
wading through “an enormous mass of material,” evaluating “the reliability of that material,” and
“immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time—somehow placing out of
mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes,
philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day.” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1989).
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requires research, evidence, and time. The same goes for textual provisions
embodied in the Constitution or a statute (consider the original public meaning
of “domestic violence” in Article IV, Section 4 of the federal Constitution).33
Still, it is well to recognize that “originalism involves a highly limited version
of the historical inquiry—one that uses limited evidence in limited ways.”34 In
essence, originalists seek to uncover the fixed meaning of words in specific
contexts.35
To discover original meaning, originalists employ a number of
conventional tools—none of which require a history degree (though a history
degree cannot hurt). Originalists often consult “old dictionaries” to understand
how a word was used at the time of its adoption.36 Originalists also use “a
variety of other linguistic conventions,” such as the rules of grammar and the
canons of construction to unearth original meaning.37 Primary source material
as well as secondary sources might elucidate the original meaning of the text
being interpreted, too.38 Indeed, consider Justice Thomas’s use in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen of historical sources, common-law
rights, custom, precedent, and analogical reasoning to deem a New York law
repugnant to the Second Amendment.39 While the process of uncovering
33. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 43 (1849).
34. Baude & Sachs, supra note 20, at 813.
35. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2154 (2022) (analyzing the
fixed meaning of the Second Amendment and applying that fixed meaning to a specific state
regulation). The Court thus interpreted the Second Amendment and then construed or determined the
legal effect to give to the interpreted meaning. See Justin W. Aimonetti & Christian Talley, Race,
Ramos, and the Second Amendment Standard of Review, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 193, 221–22 (2021)
(“[W]e can think of constitutional exegesis as having a pair of key stages: interpretation and then
construction. When we interpret a text, we seek to discover its communicative content—what the
words meant at the time of their ratification. When we then construe the text, we determine what legal
effect we should give to that meaning. The clearer the text, the smaller the ‘construction zone.’ But
sometimes constitutional provisions are ‘general, abstract, [or] vague,’ so we must resort to other
heuristics of meaning when applying them ‘to concrete constitutional cases.’ ”) (emphasis omitted).
36. Nelson, supra note 30 (noting that “the conventional usages of individual words change over
time”).
37. Id.
38. Whittington, supra note 27, at 377. One note on the use of legislative history. Many
originalists criticize the use of legislative history to the point that some think that originalists may never
under any circumstance rely on legislative history. See Hillel Y. Levin, Justice Gorsuch’s Views on
Precedent in the Context of Statutory Interpretation, 70 ALA. L. REV. 687, 697 (2019). That view holds
when an interpreter relies on legislative history to decipher the intent behind the words being
interpreted. But what legislators understand a particular word or phrase to mean may be relevant to
discovering the original public meaning of the word or phrase at the time. See Justin W. Aimonetti,
Confining Custody, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 509, 514 (2020) (exploring what members of the First
Congress understood the word “custody” to mean to assist with discovering the original public meaning
of the word).
39. 142 S. Ct. at 2154.
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original public meaning sometimes leaves substantial indeterminacies,40
originalists do not strive to tell the entire social history leading to the adoption
of the text at issue. The Fixation Thesis, in short, calls on lawyers to utilize the
lawyer’s toolbox to uncover the original meaning of language people at some
point in the past took the time to write down.
B. The Constraint Principle
The Constraint Principle represents originalism’s left bumper. The
Constraint Principle stands for the following proposition: The text’s fixed
meaning ought to constrain the interpretive latitude of decisionmakers today.41
Professor Randy Barnett has put the Principle this way: “[C]onstitutional actors
ought to follow or be constrained or be influenced in their decisions by [the
text’s] fixed meaning.”42 The Constraint Principle strives to limit the influence
of personal preference and public pressure,43 rendering the interpreter and the
process of interpretation “more legitimate.”44 An example of the Constraint
Principle might help.
Return to the pie recipe. Your mother requests that you use the ancient
family recipe to make a pie for Thanksgiving. The pinch-pound discrepancy
becomes apparent within minutes of you getting started, and you take another
ten to uncover that the two words meant the inverse in 1805. Personally, though,
you prefer savory over sweet. Plus, saltier pies are the fashion of the day. But
your mom—whose authority, as it should, controls—told you to follow the
recipe. So, what do you do? Constrain yourself to the recipe as originally
understood, or depart from the recipe and follow personal preferences and
modern trends? Originalism’s left bumper, the Constraint Principle, would have
you, the baker, use the fixed meanings of pound and pinch and thus bake a
sweeter rather than saltier pie.
The same logic applies to a judge utilizing originalism. Rather than interpret
a word in accordance with its contemporary meaning, the judge should interpret
the word in accordance with its original public meaning and then constrain later

40. Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 149
(2015); Baude & Sachs, supra note 20, at 815.
41. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 460 (2013).
42. Rueter, Hardiman, Barrett, Dorf, Prakash & Pildes, supra note 26, at 717.
43. William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2213
(2017).
44. Rueter, Hardiman, Barrett, Dorf, Prakash & Pildes, supra note 26, at 698.
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adjudication in harmony with that meaning.45 Departing from the original
public meaning increases the possibility of subjective decision-making.
***
Taken together, the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle dictate that
textual meaning becomes fixed at the time of the text’s adoption and that the
discoverable historical meaning of the text has legal significance and is
authoritative for purposes of judicial interpretation in the present.46 This Article
turns next to the noteworthy, yet understudied, case of Holmes v. Walton. In
doing so, this Article shows that the judges who overturned the judgment in that
case relied on the discoverable original public meaning of jury trial at the time
of the state constitution’s adoption and regarded that public meaning as
authoritative for purposes of later interpretation.47
III. THE SAGA OF HOLMES V. WALTON
New Jersey, as a border state separating the American and British forces
during the Revolutionary War, faced the daunting task of halting trade with
enemy forces. Contraband smuggling jeopardized the American war effort.48
And trade with the enemy undermined “the morale and loyalty of Americans”
and gave “the British the means to reconnoiter American territory.”49 In
response to the looming military crisis following the American defeat at the
Battle of Monmouth, New Jersey sought ways to prohibit trade with the
Redcoats.50

45. The pie example provides a nice display of the interpretation-construction distinction.
“[I]nterpretation refers to the process of determining a text’s linguistic meaning, and construction refers
to the process of giving the text legal effect.” Amy Barrett, The Interpretation/Construction Distinction
in Constitutional Law: Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on Constitutional Law: Introduction, 27
CONST. COMMENT 1, 1 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 96. (2010). Here, the baker
interprets the words pound and pinch and then constructs those words by giving effect to them (i.e.,
baking a sweeter rather than saltier pie).
46. Whittington, supra note 27, at 377–78; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (defining the “basic theory” behind the variations of originalism).
Originalism’s bumpers taken together thus place two tasks on those relying on an originalist
methodology: (1) using a set of tools and practices to discover the fixed communicative content of text
at the time of its adoption and (2) confining further action so that it is consistent with that meaning.
See Solum, supra note 24, at 270,
47. Whittington, supra note 27, at 377.
48. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 409; Austin Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey
Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456, 461 (1899).
49. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 152 (2014).
50. Scott, supra note 48, at 456.
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In 1778, Governor William Livingston of New Jersey enjoined “civil and
military Officers of the counties of Monmouth and Bergen to use their utmost
vigilance in preventing all commercial intercourse with the enemy.”51 Governor
Livingston also called on the New Jersey General Assembly to act, noting that
contraband smuggling across the battlelines represented “one of the most
important Objects that can engage the Attention of the Legislature.”52 Sounding
the Governor’s call, the General Assembly enacted the Enemy Seizure Act of
1778 without a dissenting vote.53
The Enemy Seizure Act authorized an individual to seize contraband
crossing enemy lines and to secure title to the seized contraband pursuant to a
jury’s judgment.54 Specifically, the Act made it “lawful for any person or
persons whomsoever to seize and secure provisions, goods, wares and
merchandize attempted to be carried or conveyed into or brought from within
the lines or encampments or any place in the possession of the subjects or troops
of the King of Great Britain.”55 The Act also permitted those who seized
contraband to obtain title to the goods with a judgment from a jury of only six
jurors rather than twelve.56 The General Assembly thought summary
proceedings essential to the war effort and therefore allowed for “hearings in
front of justices of the peace and truncated juries.”57
Pursuant to the Enemy Seizure Act, Elisha Walton, an American officer in
the patriot militia, seized goods from two local New Jersey business partners,
John Holmes and Solomon Ketchamere.58 Two days after seizing the
businessmen’s goods, Walton “obtained a trial before a sympathetic justice of
the peace, John Anderson, who rapidly called a six-man jury, heard the
evidence, and gave judgment for Walton.”59 With a forfeiture judgment in hand,
Walton obtained title to a hundred yards of silk, additional textile products, and
other goods worth a considerable sum.60 The result of the trial surprised few, as

51. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 409.
52. Id.
53. Scott, supra note 48, at 461.
54. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 409.
55. Scott, supra note 48, at 456.
56. Id. at 456–57.
57. See HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 152.
58. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 412; William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before
Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 474 (2005); Scott, supra note 48, at 457.
59. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 412.
60. Treanor, supra note 58, at 474; Scott, supra note 48, at 457.
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the situation on the ground and circumstances surrounding the war “were as
necessitous as any in American history.”61
Holmes and Ketchamere, through their attorney William Willcocks,
challenged the forfeiture judgment rendered by the six-member jury.62 Leading
up to oral argument, Willcocks lodged with the court various reasons for
reversal, “including the unconstitutionality of the trial with six jurors.”63
Willcocks referenced Section XXII of the New Jersey Constitution, which
stated “that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a
part of the law of this colony, without repeal forever.”64 Based on the
constitution’s guarantee of the inestimable right, Willcocks argued that the
court should reverse the judgment because “the [j]ury . . . consisted of six men
only” contrary to the constitution of New Jersey.65
While the court considered Willcocks’s constitutional claim, Governor
Livingston, who had once served as a Justice on New York’s Supreme Court,
heard a rumor that the court found Willcocks’s constitutional challenge
persuasive.66 In response, Governor Livingston quipped that “I should be sorry
that the supposed Event of the Controversy should give the Tories any Cause
of Triumph; but the Judges you know are bound to determine according to Law
in whose favour soever that may appear to be, let the Consequences be what
they may.”67
Rumors proved true. The court delivered its decision in September 1780,
reversing the judgment rendered against Holmes and Ketchamere and directing
“the Judgment of the Justice in the Court below be revers’d and said Plaintiffs
be restored to all Things.”68 Unfortunately, the opinion of the court is lost to
history.69 Yet primary and archival sources confirm that the court “concluded
that the legislature was prohibited by law . . . from abrogating the customary
right to trial by a twelve-member jury.”70 The court, in other words, reversed

61. HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 152.
62. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 413.
63. Id. at 414.
64. Scott, supra note 48, at 458 (emphasis added).
65. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 414–15.
66. Id. at 416.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Scott, supra note 48, at 459.
70. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121
YALE L.J. 1672, 1709 (2012). Then-contemporary evidence sheds light on the court’s reasoning,
demonstrating that the court “met the question of constitutionality squarely” and deemed the law
repugnant because it conflicted with the guarantee of a jury trial. United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp.
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the judgment “on the ground that the legislature’s authorization of six person
juries violated the state’s constitutional guarantee of the ‘inestimable right of
trial by jury.’ ”71
IV. HOLMES V. WALTON AND ITS ORIGINALIST UNDERPINNINGS
Though acclaimed as one of the earliest examples of judicial review in
North America, Holmes v. Walton should also be recognized for its originalist
underpinnings. This Article argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court reached
a quintessentially originalist outcome and almost assuredly relied on
originalism’s two bumpers to arrive at that outcome. The court, in other words,
relied on the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle to deem the statute
permitting a six-member jury to render a judgment repugnant to the state
constitution.
Start with the Fixation Thesis. Recall that the Fixation Thesis stands for the
proposition that the original meaning of text is fixed when the text is framed
and ratified.72 In 1776, the people of New Jersey passed and ratified Section
XXII of the New Jersey constitution, which guaranteed “the inestimable right
of trial by jury” in both civil and criminal cases.73 The New Jersey Constitution
983, 990 (D.N.J. 1950); see HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 416; Scott, supra note 48, at 460. Consider
just three historical episodes that show the court deemed the Enemy Seizure Act unconstitutional as
repugnant to the state constitution. First, in the months after the court rendered its decision, some
residents from northern New Jersey complained to the General Assembly that the court had “set aside
some of the Laws as unconstitutional.” HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 417; Scott, supra note 48, at
459 (“On the afternoon of the 8th of December, 1780, in the House of Assembly, ‘a petition from sixty
inhabitants of the county of Monmouth was presented and read, complaining that the justices of the
Supreme Court have set aside some of the laws as unconstitutional, and made void the proceedings of
the magistrates . . . .’ ”). Second, after Walton obtained a new trial against Holmes and Ketchamere,
Willcocks argued to the court that “as a trial by six men is unconstitutional there is no law existing by
which this cause could be tried.” HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 417. Third, Justice Kilpatrick in 1802
wrote in the case of State vs. Parkhurst that in Holmes v. Walton “it had been enacted that the trial
should be by a jury of six men; and it was objected that this was not a constitutional jury; and so it was
held; and the act upon solemn argument was adjudged to be unconstitutional, and in that case
inoperative.” State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (1802).
71. HAMBURGER, supra note 49 (quoting N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII); HAMBURGER, supra
note 10, at 415; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 543
(2006) (“In New Jersey in 1780, state court judges found a legislatively authorized six-man jury
contrary to the new state constitution.”); Jonathan Gienapp, Written Constitutionalism, Past and
Present, 39 LAW & HIST. REV. 321, 346 (2021).
72. Solum, supra note 3, at 1.
73. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (emphasis added); see Gregory E. Maggs, A Guide and Index
for Finding Evidence of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution in Early State Constitutions and
Declarations of Rights, 98 N.C. L. REV. 779, 796 (2020) (“David Brearly helped draft the New Jersey
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did not specify what number of jurors constituted a legitimate jury.74 Without a
set number of jurors specified in the text, the court looked to the original
meaning of jury trial.
In 1776, a reasonable ordinary person would have understood the right to a
jury trial to have a particular meaning.75 At that time, the trial by jury had a
well-recognized history and represented “the essential mechanism for deciding
factual questions at common law” and for adjudging the guilt of a criminal
defendant.76 Indeed, “the right to trial by jury had been in existence in England
and linked to credible sources, such as the Magna Carta.”77 With time,
Englishmen viewed juries as “the most representative institution available to
the English people.”78
Importantly, the reasonable person at the time would have understood a jury
as requiring twelve jurors for it to constitute a legitimate jury.79 The twelveConstitution of 1776 and served as the Chief Justice of New Jersey; in this capacity, he decided the
case of Holmes v. Walton—cited in State v. Parkhurst—which struck down a state law as
unconstitutional.”). See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015) (exploring the importance of the states and
their constitutions in the development of the federal republic and federal constitutional rights).
74. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic
World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 849 (2006); Moore, supra note
10, at 353 (“New Jersey’s constitutional text, like that of the later federal Constitution, was silent on
the question of how many jurors would satisfy its most fundamental guarantee.”).
75. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Power of Interpretation: Minimizing the
Construction Zone, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 919, 937–38 (2021) (“[U]ncertainties can be reduced by
the rule that directs interpreters to look to the history of an institution to understand how it operated.
Thus, a provision relating to a jury, which might have been vague in ordinary language, is assigned a
specific meaning based on how that institution functioned over time.”).
76. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 407.
77. Luzan Moore, One Less Juror: A Defendant's Right to Juror Substitution, 29 TOURO L.
REV. 1513, 1515 (2013).
78. Stephen K. Roberts, Juries and the Middling Sort: Recruitment and Performance at Devon
Quarter Sessions, 1649–1670, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN
ENGLAND, 1200–1800 at 182, 182 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988); see also Justin W.
Aimonetti & Jackson A. Myers, The Founders’ Multi-Purpose Chief Justice: The English Origins of
the American Chief Justiceship, 124 W. VA. L. REV. 203, 207 (2021) (explaining that text adopted
around the time of the Founding should be viewed from a transatlantic perspective because doing so
may reveal a deeper understanding of the original public meaning of the text at issue).
79. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil
Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (“When the Founders drafted the Bill of Rights to include the
Seventh Amendment, a jury of twelve was what they contemplated: the common law of England had
fixed the number at twelve over four hundred years before the drafting of the Bill of Rights.
Furthermore, it was a scholarly axiom at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted that a jury was
comprised of twelve. This clearly was the understanding of the Founding Generation . . . .”); Alisa
Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury:
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member jury dates back to at least 1066, when William the Conqueror brought
across the English channel the practice of trial by jury in civil and criminal
cases.80 Indeed, when the people of New Jersey adopted their constitution, “the
twelve-person unanimous criminal jury was an institution with a nearly fourhundred-year-old tradition in England.”81 Blackstone’s Commentaries
identified a trial by twelve as fundamental: No person could be found guilty of
a serious crime unless “the truth of every accusation . . . should . . . be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours
indifferently chosen, and superior to all suspicion.”82 Blackstone sounded a
similar tune for civil matters: “For the most powerful individual in the state will
be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of another’s right, when he
knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided by twelve
indifferent men.”83 In light of that history, it should come as no surprise that
colonial Virginia’s Charter of Jamestown “established the twelve-person jury
in 1607.”84 Nor should it come as a surprise that a “flurry of state-court
decisions” reported soon after the Constitutional Convention understood a
legitimate jury to require twelve jurors.85
Consider, too, that the historical record suggests that the court in Holmes v.
Walton “relied on seventeenth-century sources in refusing to apply a state
statute that required loyalists to challenge a seizure of their property before a
six-person jury.”86 In particular, the 1699 Declaration of Rights and Privileges
History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 441, 448 (2008) (“Throughout 700 years of
common-law jurisprudence, no historical evidence supports juries of numbers other than twelve.”).
80. See Arnold, supra note 79, at 3 (“For over six hundred years, Western civilization took it for
granted that a jury must be composed of twelve persons.”).
81. Robert H. Miller, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination of Williams v.
Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 643 (1998); Smith & Saks, supra
note 79, at 447 (“The number of jurors at the time of adoption—and for centuries of common-law
history preceding the Sixth Amendment—was set at twelve.”).
82. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769).
83. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 (1768).
84. Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1468 (1997).
85. Miller, supra note 81, at 643–44 n.133 (1998) (collecting cases); see also Work v. State, 2
Ohio St. 296, 304 (1853) (“[T]he truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of
indictment, information, or appeal, must be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbors, and superior to all suspicion,’ before the accused can be subjected to any manner
of punishment.”) (emphasis and internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Blackstone, supra note 82,
at 343). But see H. Richmond Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Common Law: No Magic in
Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 534 (1973) (“Juries of less than twelve are not new to America. They were
used in early colonial times and even in the first days of our nation when our native common law was
developing.”).
86. See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39 (2001).
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emanating from the East Jersey House of Representatives and the West Jersey
Concessions and Agreements of 1676, “provided that trials shall be by ‘twelve
honest men of the neighborhood’ and ‘by the verdict of twelve men,’
respectively.”87 What’s more, “the right of trial by twelve jurors had
fundamental constitutional status in New Jersey independent of colonial
charters, acts of assembly, or even the constitutional text.”88 To determine the
original, fixed meaning of jury trial, then, it seems clear that the court looked
to a combination of source material, including the “ ‘common law of England,’
‘immemorial custom,’ and prior colonial charters.”89
Move next to the Constraint Principle. After unearthing the original public
meaning of jury trial, the court “measured the statute against the state
constitution, found that the former violated the latter, and refused to apply it to
the case at hand.”90 The court, in other words, constrained its decision-making
to the fixed meaning of jury trial. The court could have concluded that Holmes
and Ketchamere had received a jury trial (six jurors notwithstanding).91 The
court could have also looked around, noticed the battle being waged against the
globe’s superpower, and upheld the judgment because a contrary result would
have dampened the American cause. But the court chose neither option. Instead,
and in the face of “profound military and economic emergencies,” the court
recognized its “duty to follow the law, and [it] therefore . . . held the summary
administrative proceedings unconstitutional for violating jury rights.”92
Because a jury of six jurors was not a jury as originally understood, the court
held that the “legislature’s emergency establishment of administrative summary
proceedings had to give way to the constitution.”93
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Holmes v. Walton relied on originalism’s
bumpers, as the court confined itself to “the traditional meaning of jury in its
decision.”94 It, in conformity with the Fixation Thesis, “consult[ed] background

87. Treanor, supra note 58, at 475; Scott, supra note 48, at 459.
88. Moore, supra note 10, at 356.
89. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta,
Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 630 (2009) (quoting
Scott, supra note 48, at 458–49).
90. Hulsebosch, supra note 74, at 849.
91. Moore, supra note 10, at 354 (“The court could have affirmed the verdict in Walton’s favor,
but could not have reversed it, based on a literal application of article XXII. There had been a ‘trial by
jury.’ Because the constitutional text did not specify how many jurors were required, the court quite
plausibly could have affirmed the verdict on textual grounds.”).
92. HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 154.
93. Id. at 152.
94. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 6, at 795.
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principles” to understand the original meaning of jury trial.95 The court next, in
conformity with the Constraint Principle, “interpreted jury as a term that in light
of its history required twelve individuals.”96 At bottom, then, Holmes not only
“provides more evidence that judicial review” in the late eighteenth century
“did not require courts to defer to any possible meaning of the text, but that they
read the text in light of historical traditions” and often decided cases in
accordance with originalism’s bumpers.97
V. TAKEAWAYS FROM HOLMES V. WALTON FOR ORIGINALISM AND BEYOND
The Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court had a choice when ruling in
Holmes v. Walton on the constitutionality of the jury’s judgment. They could
have found a way to reason around the constitutional challenge and upheld the
judgment to further American war effort. Or they could have thrown out the
judgment as repugnant to the state’s constitutional guarantee to a jury trial.
History confirms that the court chose the latter over the former. And that result
is significant for at least three reasons. First, Holmes undercuts a common
criticism of originalism—that the methodology originated in the late twentieth
century. Second, Holmes demonstrates the virtues of originalism as both an
internal and external constraint on judging. In times of crisis, originalism
constrains judicial decision-making and safeguards the rule of law. Third,
Holmes casts doubt on the original correctness of current Supreme Court
doctrine, which has read the jury trial guarantees enshrined in both the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments as permitting a jury of only six rather than requiring
twelve.
A. A Common Misconception
It is a common misconception that originalism as an interpretive
methodology is a product of recent vintage.98 As Professor Lee Strang has
95. Id. at 795 n.159; Buenger, supra note 10, at 582 (“[I]n New Jersey as early as 1779 in Holmes
v. Walton, a case challenging a conviction by a jury of six, not twelve, as the Constitution of New
Jersey required through an extension of English common law.”).
96. John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 884 (2016).
97. Id.
98. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545 (2006) (“[O]riginalism became a central organizing
principle for the Reagan Justice Department’s assault on what it regarded as a liberal federal
judiciary.”); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) ( “Originalism
is the instrument and the beneficiary of a deliberate decision by former Attorney General Edwin Meese
and others to structure the Reagan Justice Department’s critique of the Warren and Burger Courts in
jurisprudential terms.”); NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S
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documented, the goal of interpretation during the early Republic “was to
ascertain the lawmaker’s fixed communicated meaning” through conventional
interpretive tools.99 During that era, judges for the most part avoided relying on
“contemporary meaning or normative considerations” when exercising their
judicial duty.100 In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
[T]he intention of the instrument must prevail; that this
intention must be collected from its words; that its words are
to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used
by those for whom the instrument was intended; that its
provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor
extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor
contemplated by its framers.101
Lawyers and historians alike have shown that “originalism has been [in use]
since the Republic’s beginning” and that the methodological approach to
interpretation dominated the judiciary up until the New Deal Era.102 The
outcome in Holmes v. Walton adds additional support to the contention that
originalism served as a judicial mainstay for much of the nation’s early history.
Judges, even before the ratification of the federal Constitution, unearthed the
fixed meaning of textual provisions and constrained the latitude of their judicial
decision-making in accordance with that fixed meaning. In short, judges then,
as many do now, interpreted text as meaning the same as “it meant when
adopted.”103
B. Originalism as a Constraining Force
On top of demonstrating that originalism as an interpretive methodology is
not a product of the late twentieth century, Holmes v. Walton also highlights a
key virtue of originalism—its ability to constrain judicial subjectivity and thus

GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 145 (2010) (contending that Justice Black, who warmed a seat on
the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 70s, is “the inventor of originalism”); Thomas B. Colby, The
Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 716 (2011) (“Originalism, as a distinct theory of
constitutional interpretation, arose as a by-product of the conservative frustration with the broad, rightsexpansive decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts.”); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with
Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 908 (2008) (“The idea of originalism as an exclusive
theory, as the criterion for measuring constitutional decisions, emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s.”)
(emphasis omitted).
99. STRANG, supra note 4, at 11.
100. Id.
101. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
102. STRANG, supra note 4, at 2; State v. Walker, 267 P.3d 210, 216 n.1 (Utah 2011) (collecting
cases from the early Republic that relied on originalism).
103. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).
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honor the legitimate authority of the people who ratified the governing text.104
Recall that New Jersey stood at the forefront of the American war effort for
independence. A judicial decision from the state’s supreme court in favor of the
contraband smugglers posed a real danger of spiraling into a “serious military
setback.”105 And the judges of the court acknowledged the potential
ramifications of holding “an essential wartime measure unconstitutional.”106
But hold the law unconstitutional is what they did. In doing so, the court
adhered to the original meaning of the Constitution’s text and thus privileged
the will of the people who had adopted the law over the crisis of the moment.107
The court’s decision in Holmes v. Walton demonstrates the virtues of
originalism as an internal and external constraint on judging. Originalism walls
off, or at least reduces, “certain considerations that might . . . tempt[]” a
judge.108 That is not to say originalism eliminates all judicial discretion in
judicial adjudication. But it is to say that originalism cabins free-wheeling
judicial decision-making and thereby honors the will of the people who adopted
the law.109 Originalism also provides a framework that permits outsiders
looking in to judge for themselves whether the judicial reasoning has departed
from or aligns with the original public meaning of the text that has been
interpreted.110
Contrast Korematsu v. United States with Holmes v. Walton. In Korematsu,
a majority of the Supreme Court, “unmoored from originalist principles, upheld
the executive internment without trial of American citizens of Japanese descent
despite [the federal] Constitution’s express guarantees of due process and equal

104. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 271 (2005) (noting that judges naturally drift toward originalism when dealing
with issues of first impression because it constrains their decision-making latitude); see also Lawrence
B. Solum, Construction and Constraint: Discussion of Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL
STUD. 17, 18 (2013) (“Constrained by original meaning, the Justices would no longer be free to impose
their own views about controversial issues in the guise of constitutional interpretation.”).
105. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 420.
106. Id. at 418.
107. The judges stuck to original meaning of their Constitution rather than reducing it “to an
empty shell” into which the judges could pour their own preferences or other normative considerations.
BERGER, supra note 2, at 314–15 (arguing that non-originalist constitutional interpretation “reduces
the Constitution to an empty shell into which each shifting judicial majority pours its own
preferences”).
108. Baude, supra note 43, at 2224.
109. Sachs, supra note 21, at 819 (“Whatever rules of law we had at the Founding, we still have
today, unless something legally relevant happened to change them. Our law happens to consist of their
law, the Founders’ law, including lawful changes made along the way.”) (emphasis omitted).
110. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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protection of the laws.”111 The decision in Korematsu cannot “be defended as
correct in light of the Constitution’s original meaning,” as it “depended on
serious judicial invention by judges who misguidedly thought they were
providing a ‘good’ answer to a pressing social problem of the day.”112 Simply
put, the Court pursued “political ends through judicial means.”113 It upheld the
constitutionality of the executive order not because the Constitution demanded
that result, but rather to advance the American war effort.
By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Holmes v. Walton elevated
the rule of law above the realities on the ground when it disallowed the state
statute permitting a jury of only six. The decision in Holmes, unlike the decision
in Korematsu, can and should be defended as correct in light of the New Jersey
Constitution’s original meaning. The court’s decision in Holmes to grant
loyalists relief stemmed from judges putting personal preference to the side and
sticking to the original meaning of the state constitution’s text. The stark
contrast between Korematsu v. United States and Holmes v. Walton shows that
by serving as an internal and external constraint on judging, originalism
“preserv[es] the people’s legitimate political authority” and safeguards the rule
of law.114
C. Current Supreme Court Doctrine Stands on Unsteady Footing
In addition to undercutting a common criticism of originalism and showing
that originalism operates as an internal and external constrain on judging,
Holmes v. Walton adds another reason to doubt the original correctness of the
United States Supreme Court’s 1970 decision in Williams v. Florida and its
1973 decision in Colgrove v. Battin.115 Additional background shows why.116
Start first with jury trials in criminal cases. The Sixth Amendment provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury.”117 For much of the nation’s history, the
111. Gorsuch, supra note 14.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. J. Joel Alicea, The Moral Authority of Original Meaning, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 52
(2022).
115. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 89–92 (1970); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S 149, 157
(1973).
116. As noted supra note 18, Justice Gorsuch penned a forceful dissent from the denial of
certiorari involving a request for the Court to reconsider its precedent permitting a jury of less than
twelve to convict. See Khorrami v. Arizona, No. 21-1553, 2022 WL 16726030, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 7,
2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). This Article strengthens Justice Gorsuch’s
well-reasoned dissent and provides further historical fodder in support of the view that the original
public meaning of the Constitution requires a criminal trial before 12 members of the community.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Supreme Court had suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
guaranteed a defendant in all criminal proceedings a twelve-member jury.118 In
Thompson v. Utah, for instance, the Court addressed the question “whether the
jury referred to in the original [C]onstitution and in the [S]ixth [A]mendment is
a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons.”119 The Court
concluded in the affirmative, writing that “the wise men who framed the
Constitution of the United States and the people who approved it were of
opinion that life and liberty, when involved in criminal prosecutions, would not
be adequately secured except through the unanimous verdict of twelve
jurors.”120 The Court later reiterated the Constitutional guarantee of a twelvemember jury in Patton v. United States. There, the Court, looking again to
common law and English history, stated that a “constitutional jury means twelve
men as though that number had been specifically named; and it follows that,
when reduced to eleven, it ceases to be such a jury quite as effectively as though
the number had been reduced to a single person.”121 The Court added for good
measure that “the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.”122
Decades later, in the 1970 case of Williams v. Florida, the Court departed
from the history and common law when it upheld a Florida statute that provided
for a six-member jury in all noncapital cases. Justice White, writing for the
majority, conceded that previous opinions had suggested that a legitimate
criminal jury must consist of twelve jurors, yet he deemed such prior statements
unpersuasive and nonbinding.123 Justice White instead stated nothing
“suggests . . . that we do violence to the letter of the Constitution by turning to
other than purely historical considerations to determine which features of the
jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved in the Constitution.”124
Rather, in his view, the “relevant inquiry . . . must be the function that the
particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial.”125
Basing the decision on functional considerations, the Court labelled the deeply

118. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952) (“No changes or chances can alter the
content of the verbal symbol of ‘jury’—a body of twelve men who must reach a unanimous conclusion
if the verdict is to go against the defendant.”).
119. 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 51–52 (1990),
and abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 (1970).
120. Thomson, 170 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
121. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 101 (1970) (emphasis added).
122. Patton, 281 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
123. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90–93 (1970).
124. Id. at 99.
125. Id. at 99–100.
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rooted right to a jury of twelve “a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the
purposes of the jury system.”126 As a result, “state provisions allowing for fewer
than twelve jurors in a criminal trial have withstood federal constitutional
challenges” ever since the 1970 decision of Williams v. Florida.127
Though Williams involved criminal juries in state courts, the decision’s
rationale soon spread to the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of civil juries in
federal court.128 The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved.”129 Three years after Williams, the Supreme
Court in Colgrove v. Battin held that the Seventh Amendment permitted sixmember juries in federal civil cases.130 The Colgrove Court embraced the same
functional rationale it developed in Williams, drawing on the results of
scientific studies rather original meaning.131 In doing so, the Court concluded
that a departure from the twelve-member standard in federal civil cases would
do no violence to any “substantive aspect of the right of trial by jury.”132 And
the Court did not care that “twelve jurors was a well-established limitation on
[a civil] jury size in 1791” because reducing a civil jury from twelve to six
members did not impair the fundamental role of the jury.133 Justice Thurgood
Marshall penned a fiery dissent, noting that when “a historical approach is
applied to the issue at hand, it cannot be doubted that the Framers envisioned a
jury of 12 when they referred to trial by jury.”134
Originalists should not only question the methodological underpinnings of
both Williams v. Florida and Colgrove v. Battin for straying from the original
meaning of jury trial, but good reason exists to doubt the continued legitimacy
of at least Williams v. Florida in the wake of intervening Supreme Court

126. Id. at 102; see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 n.2 (1995) (“We held in
Williams v. Florida, that the 12–person requirement to which Story referred is not an indispensable
component of the right to trial by jury.”) (citation omitted).
127. People v. Taylor, 503 P.3d 912, 916 (Colo. App. 2021). But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (holding that defendant’s “trial on criminal charges before a five-member jury
deprived him of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
128. Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 84, at 1475.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
130. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973).
131. Id. at 157.
132. Id.; see Miller, supra note 81, at 628–29.
133. Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach
Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 923 (2013).
134. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 176 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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precedent.135 In the 2020 case of Ramos v. Louisiana, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment requires unanimity among the votes of jurors in criminal
cases.136 In reaching that result, the Court noted that history supports the view
that no person could be found guilty of a serious crime unless convicted “by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors.”137 The Court’s
mention of the history of twelve-member jurors followed close on the heels of
some justices identifying Williams v. Florida as a dubious precedent.138 Casting
doubt on Williams v. Florida makes sense because laws permitting a jury of
fewer than twelve members are “hard to reconcile with an idea that our
Constitution can be legitimately altered only by amendment.”139 Plus, Holmes
v. Walton adds just another reason why the Court should reconsider and
“abandon Williams [v. Florida] and return to the originalist position of twelvemember juries.”140 The same should hold true for Colgrove v. Battin.141

135. See Wofford v. Woods, 969 F.3d 685, 707 n.27 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Juries of less than twelve
were upheld in Williams v. Florida. [But] Williams may no longer be completely sound after Ramos
[v. Louisiana].”) (citations omitted); State v. Khorrami, No. 1 CA-CR 20-0088, 2021 WL 3197499, at
*9 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 29, 2021), review denied, (Feb. 8, 2022) (“In Ramos, however, the Supreme
Court did not address any issue of constitutionally permissible jury size, much less overrule Williams.
Rather, the Supreme Court said due process requires unanimous verdicts in criminal trials.”) (emphasis
omitted).
136. 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020).
137. Id.; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (making the same point).
138. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 867–68 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
139. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 34–35 (2004); see also
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 108 (2016) (“We
likewise doubt the pedigree of modern cases on . . . jury numbers.”); Jordan Gross, Incorporation by
Any Other Name? Comparing Congress’ Federalization of Tribal Court Criminal Procedure with the
Supreme Court’s Regulation of State Courts, 109 KY. L.J. 299, 343 (2021) (“Following Ramos,
although a state may use a six-person jury, it must be unanimous.”).
140. Lessard v. State, 232 So. 3d 13, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (Makar, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). Whether a decision overruling Williams v. Florida would apply retroactively is a
question beyond the scope of this Article. The answer, however, seems almost certainly no in light of
Edwards v. Vannoy. Edwards v. Vannoy 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1562 (2021) (“[N]ew procedural rules do not
apply retroactively on federal collateral review.”); Khorrami v. Arizona, No. 21-1553, 2022 WL
16726030, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Williams
was wrong the day it was decided, it remains wrong today, and it impairs both the integrity of the
American criminal justice system and the liberties of those who come before our Nation’s courts.”).
141. The Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated to the states. As a result, state juries
with less than twelve members would remain permissible even if the Court overruled Colgrove v.
Battin.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes v. Walton bears the
hallmarks of an originalist decision. The court ruled in conformity with the
Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle. It looked to the fixed meaning of
jury trial as understood in 1776 and then constrained itself to that fixed meaning
when deciding the legal question presented. By relying on the two animating
principles of originalism to reach an originalist outcome, the court’s decision
in Holmes v. Walton pushes back against the common misconception that
originalism is a product of the late twentieth century; it highlights the virtues of
originalism as an internal and external constraint on judging; and it casts doubt
on the original correctness of Williams v. Florida and Colgrove v. Battin. In the
face of growing calls from non-originalists and common good constitutionalists
to throw originalism overboard, this Article contends that originalists today
should look to past cases like Holmes v. Walton for guidance and support.
Though some doubt the workability of originalism, old cases like Holmes v.
Walton should inspire confidence in the continued benefits of the interpretive
methodology. As demonstrated by Holmes v. Walton, originalism honors the
will of the people who adopted the written law, serves as an internal and
external constraint on judging, and preserves the rule of law.

